A REEXAMINATION OF NONSUBSTANTIVE UNCON-SCIONABILITY
Alan SchuJartz :If:
T HE doctrine of unconscionability, which a court may invoke to invalidate a contract, has a nonsubstantive and a substantive branch. Nonsubstantive unconscionability arises when certain factors, such as a lack of commercial sophistication, apparently prevent a contracting party from exercising his freedom to choose the terms of an agreement.
1 Substantive unconscionability arises when a contract yields a result that affects a contracting party too harshly or that affects a noncontracting party adversely. Such contracts may include an agreement containing a disclaimer of warranties 2 or an assignment of ,vages.
3 These two branclles of un-
• Professor of Law, University of Southern California-Law Center. Earlier versions of this paper were presented before the Commercial, Contract and Related Consumer Law Section of the Association of American Law Schools, December 1976, and a Faculty Workshop at the University of Southern California Law Center. Michael Graetz, Michael E. Levine, Stephen J. Morse, Charles J. Goetz, Julius G. Getman and Joseph F. Brodley made particularly useful comments on prior drafts, and David Grether, of the California Institute of Technology, also made thoughtful suggestions. The responsibility for any errors tha t remain is mine. 1 See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 467-68, 150 P.2d 436, 443-44 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J., 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) .
2 See U.C.C. § 2-719 (3). A frequently cited rationale for not enforcing a warranty disclaimer is to spread the loss among many consumers rather than to impose the entire loss upon one unfortunate consumer. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) . 3 An assignment of wages may adversely affect the assignor's family or his creditors other than the assignee. In an early case declaring unconstitutional a statute permitting wage assignments, a Pennsylvania court noted:
[F]reedom of contract is a great and necessary right, but it has its limit. And this limit is reached and passed when a man's future labor is pledged to pay his past debts, with the consequence that he and his family are rendered liable to fall from the status of free citizenship into the degradation of pauperism. Foster 's Application, 23 Pa. D. 558, 564 (1914) . The same policy considerations motivated many legislatures to permit wage assignments only if the debtor and his spouse had signed a written agreement. See Fortas, Wage Assignments in Chicago-State Street Furniture Co. v. Armour &-Co., 42 YALE L.J. 526, 553-54 (1933) . Most states now prohibit wage assignments. See UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 3.305. To protect the property available to other creditors, some commentators also have argued against pennitting a debtor to assign a security interest in after-acquired property. See, e.g., Countryman, Code Security conscionability hereinafter are labeled "nonsubstantive" factors or objections and "substantive" factors or objections, respectively.4 This article explores the nonsubstantive objections to the enforcement of a contract. 5 These objections fall into four categories. The first category, poverty, involves those situations where a poor consumer, although he would prefer not to bear certain risks llnder a contract, can afford only with great difficulty an agreement that allocates these risks to the seller. The second category, market unresponsiveness, comprises two possible restrictions upon a contracting party's freedom of choice. First, a buyer accepting a standardized agreement may have to take terms that do not reflect his true preferences because the additional cost of particularizing the contract would exceed the additional benefit that he would derive from an individualized agreement. Second, a seller exercising monopoly power may offer a buyer fewer choices than wOllld exist in a competitive market. The third category of nonsubstantive unconscionability, incompetency, addresses the problem of a buyer who may be too unsophisticated or too inept to Inake contracts that fully satisfy his preferences. The fourth category, lack of information, involves those situations where a contracting party lacks the information to make his preferences and purchases congruent, eitller because the information is unavailable or beCatlSe the cost of finding and absorbing it exceeds, at the margin, the value of the information.
This article seeks to demonstrate that the first three categories of nonsubstantive objections described above do not support a decision to invalidate a contract. To the contrary, the factor relating [Vol. 63:1053
The following analysis of each category of nonsubstantive unconscionability assumes that the other categories are absent. For example, the discussion of poverty assumes that markets are responsive, buyers are competent, and buyers have sufficient information. Because lack of information is not considered here, the analysis always assumes that buyers have enough information to make rational market choices. In addition, the article assumes that each nonsubstantive factor has only independent importance to the decision of whether to enforce an agreement. If the policy considerations underlying, for example, the poverty and incompetence objections suggest that each of these categories is individually irrelevant to an enforcement decision, this article assumes that these objections, taken together, are also irrelevant. This assumption seems logically justified, because summing objections that are irrelevant to contract enforcement should not produce a relevant composite objection.
I. POVERTY
A contracting party's poverty is commonly thought to militate in four ways against enforcing an agreement. First, poverty may impede the buyer's efforts to purchase a "fair" contract. The cost of a contract reflects, among other things, the agreement's allocation of risk between buyer and seller. For example, a contract disclaiming product warranties usually is cheaper than a contract providing such warranties.9 Although an affluent buyer often can pay the premium necessary to induce a seller to assume significant risks under a contract, a poor buyer may experience great difficulty in trying to buy away disfavored terms.
Second, poverty is thought to correlate strongly with a buyer's lack of commercial sophistication. A poor consumer, therefore, is often said to be at a disadvantage relative to more affluent parties in understanding and negotiating contracts. Third, poverty may restrict the flow of commercial information to poor consumers. If sellers provide less information in ghetto markets than in other markets,.even a poor consumer skilled in bargaining may be unable to evaluate the terms of a proposed agreement. Fourth, poverty 9 Although the analysis applies equally to other contractual provisions, this article often will refer to warranty disclaimers because the effect of such provisions is easy to understand. may exacerbate the consequences of certain contract clauses. An acceleration clause, for example, may bear more harshly upon a poor consumer than upon an affluent consumer. This article, unlike many commentaries 10 and judicial opinions,ll distinguishes among these four aspects of poverty because each aspect implicates different institutional and policy considerations germane to the question of whether to enforce a contract. The first aspect, poverty as an impediment to a poor consumer's ability to buy away disfavored terms, is discussed in Part I. The second aspect, poverty as a possible limitation upon a consumer's competence, is discussed in Part III. The third and fourth aspects are beyond the scope of this article.'2 Therefore, the terms "poverty" and "poor buyers," as used in Part I, refer to the situation where a contracting party has so little money that he can buy away disfavored terms only with considerable difficulty.
A. Prohibiting Particular Contract Clauses
Prohibiting a contract clause because a poor buyer finds it difficult to purchase more favorable terms yields a nonoptimal result. Assume, for example, that a retailer is offering two contracts that are identical except for one clause: the first contract, which costs 10 For example, the recent Property Restatement imposes an "implied warranty of habitability" on landlords and provides that a disclaimer of the implied warranty, if unconscionable, may be unenforceable. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY ?? 5.1, 5.6 (1977). A "factor" relevant to a finding of unconscionability is "[w]hether . . . the agreement . . . (especially if it relates to low or moderate income residential property) imposes unreasonable liabilities or burdens on persons who are financially ill-equipped to assume those burdens and who may have had significant inequality of bargaining power ...."
Id. ? 5.6, Comment e(6). This single "factor" seems to combine all four aspects of poverty: whether an agreement imposes unreasonable burdens on financially ill-equipped persons relates to the fourth aspect; whether an agreement imposes such burdens on persons who lack equal bargaining power implicates the first, second, and third aspects. Other commentators also seem not to make the distinctions drawn here respecting poverty. See $100, includes a warranty against product defects, while the second contract, which costs $90, includes a disclaimer of the warranty. The hypothetical retailer has customers for both contracts, but the state, by statute or judicial opinion, later bans the warranty disclaimer. Under these circumstances, the prohibition against warranty disclaimers neither helps nor hurts those customers who would have purchased warranty coverage. The prohibition, however, harms the customers who would have purchased a contract disclaiming all warranties. These consumers apparently value the insurance against product defects provided by a warranty less than they value other uses for their $10. Therefore, the prohibition against disclaimers yields a nonoptimal result: some buyers regard themselves as worse off than before the ban, and no buyers regard themselves as better off.13
This result is particularly undesirable because banning warranty disclaimers is likely to affect the poor more adversely than the affluent. A poor person spends a large percentage of his income on goods for which his demand is income-inelastic,14 e.g., food, shelter, and clothing. As his income rises, he will begin to purchase goods for which his demand is more income-elastic. Analysis indicates that a poor person's demand for warranty protection is probably more income-elastic than that for "necessities." Many of the contract clauses that are now of concern, such as warranty disclaimers, shift purchase risks to buyers. Poor people generally are more risk averse than rich people because they cannot withstand large losses.15 The poor, however, may lose relatively less than the middle class when purchase risks materialize because, in the circumstances discussed here, the poor have less at stake. For example, middle 13 The measure of optimality employed here is the "Pareto criterion." According to this criterion, an allocation of resources is optimal only if no one may be made better off, in his own estimation, without simultaneously making someone else worse off, and a change in the allocation is optimal only if it makes at least one person better off and no one worse off. See If increased risk-bearing produces economies of scale, however, the prohibition against a warranty disclaimer does not necessarily yield a nonoptimal result. The prohibition would increase the sale of contracts containing a warranty against product defects. Assume, for example, that economies of scale cause a reduction in the cost of warranty coverage from $10 to $5. The prohibition would then benefit buyers who would pay $5 or more for warranty protection but would harm buyers who would not pay at least $5 for such protection. In theory, then, the new legal rule barring warranty disclaimers could yield an optimal result regardless of whether the rule is analyzed in terms of "Pareto optimality" (that is, where the winners from a legal change actually compensate the losers and remain better off in their own estimation) or in terms of the "Scitovsky criterion" (that is, where, absent transaction costs, the winners could compensate the losers, and the losers could not bribe the winners to oppose the change). 681-82 (1968) . Slight economies of scale sometimes may exist. For example, a firm that services a large number of warranties and that maintains a large inventory of replacement parts may achieve economies of scale when purchasing its inventory. Also, a firm that requires its workers to specialize in the handling of particular complaints may obtain economies stemming from the specialization of labor. Such economies of scale, however, would seldom be significant because the business of selling and servicing warranties is primarily labor intensive. Second, even if important economies of scale do exist, sellers are likely to have tapped these opportunities without state intervention. When such economies exist, a seller typically will increase his output to obtain the higher profits made possible by the reduction in the average cost of producing each unit of output. Therefore, a seller would exploit existing economies of scale even absent a legal rule prohibiting warranty disclaimers.
The foregoing analysis ignores the possibility that, if the preferences of nonpurchasers of warranties were considered, a prohibition against warranty disclaimers might yield an optimal or distributionally desirable result. Assume that X, a wealthy individual, derives satisfaction (or, as economists say, "utility") from the knowledge that poor people make "wise" purchases. Because X believes that buying warranties is "wise," his utility rises when the prohibition against disclaimers forces buyers to purchase warranties. Under these circumstances, the conclusion that prohibiting disclaimers makes no one better off is false: the prohibition, though not benefitting any buyers, does benefit the X's.22 If the X's could compensate the disadvantaged buyers and remain better off than before the change, and if the buyers could not bribe the X's to oppose the change, then the prohibition would yield an optimal result. However, if the result of these hypothetical transactions were impossible to calculate, the question of whether the ban is 22 This analysis of X's preferences assumes that utility functions are interdependent. That is, the analysis assumes that persons derive utility not only from their own income and nonmarket activities, but also from particular, approved activities of other people. In this context, X derives utility from the knowledge that the poor are buying warranties, a practice of which X approves.
Some commentators point to the existence of interdependent utility functions to support the argument that resources can be redistributed in an optimal manner. They argue that, because the donors also derive satisfaction from increases in the donees' utility, a redistribution of resources can increase the welfare of some persons without decreasing the wel- Relying upon interdependent utility functions to justify restrictions upon individual choice, however, is troublesome for two reasons. First, if the majority legitimately may regulate a minority because the latter's choices affect the former's utility, the danger exists that the majority could restrain unduly the minority's freedom and privacy. See A. SEN, supra note 17, at 82-83. Second, as will be developed below, the calculation required to aggregate the preferences of warranty purchasers and nonpurchasers is an almost impossible task. Thus, arguments resting on the existence of interdependent utility functions tend to be inconclusive. [Vol. 63:1053 desirable would turn on whether society preferred to make the X's better off at the expense of the disadvantaged buyers.
Including the preferences of both warranty purchasers and nonpurchasers in the optimality calculus, however, does not alter the conclusion that prohibiting warranty disclaimers or other contract clauses is undesirable. The optimality calculus must sum not only the effect of the prohibition on the utilities of X's (positive) and of buyers (negative), but also the effect on the utilities of those Y's (negative) who derive satisfaction from knowing that the poor are free to contract. No theory predicts the outcome of this calculation, and the empirical evidence that might support it is simply too expensive to collect. Even so, if one is to speculate, a prohibition against disclaimers could not be optimal unless the X's knew that the prohibition existed, and popular awareness of particular restrictions on the ability to contract seems limited. Therefore, even when the preferences of nonpurchasers are considered, a prohibition against disclaimers seems unlikely to yield an optimal result.
Even if this optimality calculus is thought to yield an inconclusive result, a prohibition against disclaimers is difficult to justify on distributional grounds. An initial weakness in such a position is the fact that the individuals who supposedly benefit from knowing that the poor are making "wise" purchases must, in fact, know that the prohibition exists. But, as noted above, the level of popular awareness regarding restrictions on freedom to contract is low. A more serious objection is that the prohibition, which sacrifices the welfare of the poor to satisfy the preferences of the more affluent, has an undesirable distributional effect. Prohibiting warranty disclaimers or other contract clauses because the affluent would derive more utility from banning such clauses than the poor would gain from permitting them runs counter to prevailing redistributive rationales.
In sum, when a contract clause is prohibited because a poor buyer finds it difficult to purchase a more favorable provision, the court or legislature prohibiting the clause produces a nonoptimal result. The prohibition creates a situation in which some buyers regard themselves as worse off than before the ban and no buyers regard themselves as better off. Even when the welfare of nonpurchasers is considered, the utility calculus suggests that prohibiting a contract clause will yield a nonoptimal outcome. That outcome, moreover, is distributionally objectionable. Thus, a buyer's pov-erty militates in favor of, rather than against, enforcing an agreement.23
B. Compensatory Grants or Subsidies
To correct the nonoptimal result of a ban on warranty disclaimers, a legislature that enacted the prohibition might seek to compensate poor buyers for their welfare losses. By compensating the poor, the legislature could overcome some of the problems, discussed above, that arise when a warranty disclaimer is prohibited. For example, if the government provided compensatory grants, the fact that aggregating the preferences of warranty purchasers and nonpurchasers is almost impossible would be a less serious obstacle because the poor suffer no harm when they are compensated and the affluent would not benefit at the expense of the poor. This solution, however, seems unworkable because the proper amount of compensation is simply too difficult to determine. Not only is it generally impractical to measure welfare losses resulting from a legal change, but poor buyers would have a strong incentive to engage in strategic behavior by claiming nonexistent injury or by overstating the extent of actual injury. Because welfare losses are subjective and difficult to quantify, the state seldom could demonstrate that a claimant had exaggerated his loss. Thus. a compensation system is not a tenable solution to the nonoptimality problem.
Subsidizing particular contract clauses is an apparently more promising legislative solution. For example, if a seller would charge $10 to delete a disclaimer, the legislature could subsidize him to reduce the price to $3. More buyers then might purchase the warranty. If such a subsidy is provided, however, a court should not intervene to prohibit the warranty disclaimer. A judicial prohibition against the disclaimer would contravene the statutory purpose underlying the subsidy, which is to increase seller risk-bearing by influencing buyer choice, not by eliminating it. In addition, such a prohibition, for reasons outlined above, is unlikely to yield an optimal result.24 23 A court or legislature, of course, tenably can invalidate an agreement due to substantive or informational considerations that outweigh the fact that a buyer is poor.
24 A legislature that attempted to subsidize the production of warranties also would confront problems involving the subsidy's effectiveness and feasibility. In mass markets, sales contracts do not reflect the individual preferences of every buyer, because of the high cost of particularprice inelastic, the desired impact of a subsidy, which is to boost the sale of the subsidized item, would occur only slightly, because consumers would not increase significantly their consumption of the subsidized good or service. Rather than buying much more of the subsidized item as its price fell, the consumers would purchase approximately the same amount, using for other purposes the savings that the price reduction made available. See generally C. SHOUP, PUBLIC FINANCE 158-61 (1969). The relevant "service" here is "seller risk-bearing for a price," which probably is price inelastic because it has few close substitutes.
The administrative problem is the difficult task of pricing a subsidy. The cost of a subsidy has two components: the cost of honoring the warranty discounted by the likelihood that the item will fail, and the residual cost borne by the consumer. In this section, the term "standardized contract" refers to a form agreement in which the seller offers a buyer neither a choice of terms nor a choice among a variety of form agreements. Unless otherwise indicated, see note 30 infra, the term "particularized contract" refers to the situation where a buyer either may obtain an agreement customtailored to his individual preferences or may select among a wide variety of form agreements.
izing such agreements. The costs incurred when a seller drafts and administers a particularized agreement often exceed the additional benefit a buyer would derive from such an agreement. As a result, sellers often cannot offer particularized contracts at prices that even affluent consumers would pay. Thus, all buyers sometimes must accept contractual provisions that they, in some sense, do not want.
The failure of sellers to particularize contracts is a frequently invoked aspect of nonsubstantive unconscionability. Two arguments seem to underlie judicial hostility towards standardized agreements.27 The first argument presupposes that sellers mistakenly tend to ignore the preferences of buyers. More specifically, sellers are sometimes thought not to realize that enough consumers prefer particular contract clauses to enable these clauses to be offered at reasonable prices. If a consumer were to request such a provision, a seller therefore would charge "too much" for it or not offer it at all. Making a seller's failure to particularize contracts militate against enforcement responds to this problem by raising the cost of a seller's mistakes. A seller who offers the "wrong" mix of contract clauses thereby faces a reduced likelihood that a court will enforce his agreements. Because nonenforcement is costly, sellers are likely to respond by investing more resources in ascertaining consumer preferences accurately.
The second argument underlying judicial hostility towards standardized agreements assumes that each consumer has a right to affect his own contracts-that is, consumers have a right to contractual self-determination. This assumption, in turn, rests on the premise that expanding a person's "opportunity set" (his range of choices) is socially desirable. According to this view, society and individual consumers will benefit if consumers have a large array of contract clauses from which to choose. Making a seller's failure to particularize militate against enforcement responds to the desire 27 Neither of these arguments justifies a legal rule under which a seller's failure to particularize contracts militates against enforcement. The first argument implicitly and erroneously presupposes that courts are more likely than sellers to gauge consumer preferences accurately. The second argument is unpersuasive on two grounds: it fails to balance properly the right to contractual selfdetermination against the efficiency losses stemming from increased contractual particularization, and its assumption that nonenforcement often will increase contract variety is probably incorrect.
Judicial Review of Business Judgments Respecting Consumer
Preferences The first argument for restricting the enforceability of standardized agreements-that sellers mistakenly fail to satisfy buyer preferences-rests upon the premise that a court should decide whether a seller accurately gauged consumer preferences. This premise, however, ignores the fact that a seller has a large advantage over a court in accurately ascertaining those preferences. A seller has greater expertise in commercial matters, better facilities for ascertaining consumer preferences, and greater incentive to know them accurately.28 In light of these institutional considerations, a court should not review business decisions respecting whether buyers in the aggregate did or did not prefer particular 28 The assertion that sellers have an advantage over courts in accurately ascertaining buyer preferences does not imply that sellers always correctly satisfy those preferences. Foi example, the cost to a seller of making a warranty is partly a function of the care the buyer exercises in using the product. In a market where many buyers are apt to be careless, a seller may make fewer warranties than the amount dictated by consumer demand, because it is too expensive to distinguish between careful and careless buyers. clauses. And, if a court should refrain from such a review, the first argument, which presupposes that courts ought to decide whether sellers have mistakenly ignored consumer preferences, must be rejected.29
Efficiency Losses Versus the Expansion of Individual Choice 30
The second argument against standardized agreements seeks to vindicate a buyer's right to contractual self-determination by restricting the enforceability of such agreements. An initial objection to this argument is that a restriction on the enforceability of standardized contracts would create an efficiency loss.31 This objection rests on two assumptions. First, to make the objection nontrivial, it assumes that the cost to a seller of the diminished enforceability of his standardized agreements exceeds the cost of drafting and administering several new contracts. Thus, the reduced likelihood of enforcing a standardized agreement would cause a seller to offer a greater variety of contracts. Second, the objection assumes that sellers do not overlook profitable activities-that is, sellers do not mistakenly ignore buyer preferences.32
The efficiency loss would result from a reduction of output, which would occur because the creation of several new contracts will increase a seller's fixed and variable costs. The fixed costs of producing a new contract will include lawyer's fees for drafting the agreement, printer's fees for start-up tasks in printing the agreement, and training costs for acquainting sales personnel with the new provisions. The increase in variable costs will relate to sales 29 Sellers also have a comparative advantage over legislatures and administrative agencies in accurately ascertaining consumer preferences, for the reasons given above. Thus, the foregoing argument also applies when these institutions seek to increase the satisfaction of consumer preferences by banning or requiring particular contract clauses. 30 The shift in the supply curve from S to S' would cause physical output to decline from Q* to Q' and price to increase from P* to P'.33 These changes would create a deadweight efficiency loss of consumers' and producers' surplus (the shaded triangle in the figure above), for without the legal rule additional sales of the physical product would be made at prices buyers would be willing to pay. The desirability of a legal rule that would induce sellers to offer a greater variety of contracts therefore depends upon whether the benefit of increased buyer choice exceeds the cost of the deadweight efficiency loss that the rule would create. This question is difficult to answer as an abstract inquiry. But resolving the question directly is unnecessary, because society has chosen efficiency over opportunity in an analogous context. An individual consumer rarely can influence the content of products: the market seldom responds to the idiosyncratic preferences of individual buyers. Thus, seven-cylinder cars or four-door refrigerators are not produced. The dissatisfaction of individual consumers or small consumer groups, however, seldom results in state intervention. Our society ordinarily is satisfied if aggregate consumer preferences influence the content of products because the costs of requiring sellers to satisfy idiosyncratic preferences seem to outweigh the benefit of giving people more control over the products they consume. 33 The argument assumes that any possible increase in consumer demand would not generate additional revenue sufficient to offset the increase in cost. This assumption ensures that the demand curve (D) will intersect the new supply curve (S') at a point corresponding to a reduction in output. It may be thought that, contrary to this assumption, demand would increase enough to offset the increase in cost, because sellers would be offering a more attractive package-the physical product plus a greater variety of contract terms. This possibility, however, is foreclosed by the second assumption outlined above, see note 32 supra and accompanying text, which provides that sellers do not mistakenly ignore buyer preferences. According to that assumption, if increased demand would offset increased costs, then sellers already would have exploited such an opportunity for increased profits. Thus, even though consumer demand may increase, such an increase will not offset the increased cost of offering a greater variety of contracts.
If declining average costs to contract innovation exist, however, sellers, absent legal stimulus, would underproduce contract variety. But it seems unlikely that declining average costs obtain for an industry at large. In the context of contractual provisions, the costs of requiring sellers to satisfy the preferences of individuals or small groups also seem high, while the gains from expanding the opportunity sets of consumers seem no greater, in the qualitative sense, than the gains in the product context. Until the product analogy is persuasively distinguished, society must be presumed to prefer efficiency over opportunity in the context of contractual provisions. Therefore, the failure to particularize a contract militates in favor of, rather than against, enforcing the standardized agreement.
The foregoing analysis, of course, assumed that a legal rule restricting the enforceability of standardized contracts would induce a seller to offer a greater variety of contracts. Although an increase in the variety of contracts theoretically is possible,34 a legal rule restricting the enforceability of standardized agreements would be unlikely to yield this result in practice. Under such a legal rule, the cost to a seller of offering a single standardized contract is the reduced likelihood that he can enforce the contract. But the cost of bearing this risk probably is small, because the law of unconscionability renders a contract unenforceable only when a buyer raises both a valid nonsubstantive objection (e.g., the seller's failure to particularize the contract) and a valid substantive objection (e.g., too harsh a bargain). By contrast, the cost to a seller of offering a variety of contracts is significant and immediate. Thus, sellers probably would rather bear the risk of nonenforceability than create more contracts. The intuitively plausible contention that the cost of creating new contracts would exceed the cost of not doing so is supported, albeit impressionistically, by the continued widespread use of standardized contracts notwithstanding the longstanding judicial hostility toward such agreements.35 Therefore, a legal rule restricting the enforceability of standardized agreements contracts increases in relation to the number of contracts sold. Put another way, creating more contracts increases the demand on the factors of "contract production" (e.g., lawyers, printers, secretaries, and employees to administer contracts). Thus, it is unlikely that sellers will underproduce contract variety. 34 ultimately may be pointless, because such a rule is unlikely to expand consumer opportunity sets.
In sum, neither argument against standardized agreements supports a decision to invalidate a contract. First,-the fact that a seller might mistakenly fail to satisfy buyer preferences is no ground for judicial intervention because a court is ill-suited to second-guess business judgments regarding buyer preferences. Second, if enforcing a buyer's right to contractual self-determination induces a seller to particularize his agreements, the increased particularization of contracts apparently would create an efficiency loss that outweighs the societal benefit derived from enforcing the buyer's right. If, as seems likely, enforcing the right to contractual selfdetermination fails to induce a significant increase in the particularization of contracts, then this argument against enforcing standardized agreements simply is misplaced. Therefore, a seller's failure to particularize his contracts should not militate against enforcing them.36 B. Market Power Courts and commentators have suggested that a seller's ability to exercise market power should militate against the enforcement of an agreement. This suggestion apparently rests on the premise, which empirical evidence fails to confirm, that a monopolist or an oligopolist is less responsive than a competitive seller to consumer preferences regarding the content of contracts. This section, however, demonstrates the existence of plausible conditions under which market power is unrelated to the satisfaction of consumer wants. Although resting on untested behavioral assumptions, this demonstration, when considered together with empirical evidence contradicting the conventional wisdom, strongly suggests that resources devoted to proving the existence of market power would be wasted. Therefore, courts should not recognize market power as an aspect of nonsubstantive unconscionability. The Henningsen court implied that sellers exercising market power tend to ignore buyer preferences respecting contractual terms. But this view is intuitively implausible. If a monopolist's customers prefer to have warranties rather than disclaimers, and if these customers will pay the premium for additional warranty protection, the monopolist would be irrational not to offer a warranty. Offering only a disclaimer would cost him potential profits. A more plausible version of the Henningsen claim is that a monopolist or an oligopolist tends to be less responsive than a competitive seller to consumer preferences.39 If so, a monopolist, for example, would make fewer or narrower warranties than a competitive seller. Even as reformulated, however, the argument is suspect because of an absence of empirical support. In fact, some empirical evidence seems to support the opposite conclusion. Automobile warranties, made by sellers thought to have substantial market power, seem qualitatively and quantitatively similar to warranties issued in more competitive markets.40 Neither the content of warranties nor the content of other contract clauses has been shown to vary with market structure.
Consistent with the empirical evidence contradicting the second Henningsen rationale, a theoretical argument, outlined below, indicates plausible conditions under which market structure does not affect the extent to which a buyer's preferences for contract content are satisfied. The argument assumes that, ceteris paribus, the extent to which a buyer's preferences are satisfied varies with the quality of whatever he purchases. Contracts, like products, can be ranked by quality: a "high quality" contract has more characteristics that a consumer prefers (e.g., a comprehensive warranty) or less that he dislikes (e.g., an acceleration clause) than a "low quality" contract. The argument made below demonstrates that contract "quality" is not a function of market structure. Although developed, for the sake of convenience, with reference to a consumer product, the argument is equally applicable to a contract, because contracts also vary in quality.
The argument that product quality is unrelated to market structure rests on three assumptions. First, it assumes that consumer demand for quality does not vary with the amount of physical product consumed. Second, the argument assumes that all firms within a competitive industry use the same technology regardless of the level of industrywide output.41 Third, it assumes that the production function for a monopolist is "similar" to that of a competitive industry in the sense that the monopolist and competitive industry face the same cost-minimizing factor combinations at any level of output.42 The second and third assumptions, taken together, assure that considerations of cost-minimization will lead a monopolist and a competitive industry to produce identical products, albeit at possibly different levels of output. Given these three assumptions, a firm will produce the same level of product quality regardless of whether the firm is a monopolist or a perfect competitor. In light of the first assumption, a monopolist and a competitor will face the same demand for quality even though a monopolist will tend to produce less physical product than a perfect competitor. In light of the second and third assumptions, a firm, regardless of market structure, will face the same cost constraints when producing a given level of product quality. To the extent that neither demand nor cost vary with market structure, a monopolist and a competitor can be expected to produce goods of the same quality. And, to the extent that a contract is analogous to a product, a monopolist and a competitor will offer contracts of the same quality.
Although none of the three assumptions discussed above has been rigorously tested, the first assumption-that demand for quality is unrelated to physical output-gains support in our everyday behavior. A consumer who pays a premium to purchase a high quality product typically will pay the same premium for the extra quality when he purchases another unit of the product. Assuming, for example, that high-test gasoline is five cents per gallon more expensive than regular gasoline, a consumer will pay the same five cent per gallon premium regardless of whether he purchases one gallon or twenty gallons.43 The premium consumers pay for quality apparently is independent of the level of output.
Further study is required to prove the foregoing argument that market structure does not affect contract quality and, therefore, does not influence the satisfaction of consumer preferences. As previously noted, the key assumptions underlying the argument are untested. Moreover, economists have only recently begun to explore the relationship between market structure and quality. Their efforts lend some support to the conclusion reached above, 43 An example of this phenomenon in a contractual context is that a consumer probably would pay the same premium for a "full," rather than a "limited," warranty, regardless of whether he enters into one or more contracts. A seller makes a "full" warranty when he agrees to repair and replace defective parts or goods at his own expense, in a reasonable time, and does not limit the duration of implied warranties. A warranty that imposes fewer obligations on a seller is a "limited" warranty. See Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act ? 103(a), 15 U.S.C. ? 2303(a) (Supp. V 1975) . and they certainly have not reached a theoretical consensus supporting the contrary conclusion that a monopolist tends to underproduce quality.44 Finally, the entire argument rests on the analogy, albeit a strong analogy, between a product and a contract. In sum, the argument is, at best, plausible but unverified.
A court or legislature nonetheless should act as if the argument outlined above were true. Contrary to the unproven conventional wisdom that a monopolist or an oligopolist is less responsive than a competitive seller to consumer preferences regarding contract quality, the foregoing argument presents a plausible theory consistent with the empirical evidence that the content of contracts does not vary with market structure. Further, if monopoly power is a factor that militates against enforcing an agreement, a buyer seeking to invalidate a contract must prove that the seller actively exercised monopoly power. Because market structure apparently is unrelated to contract content, however, it seems unwise to permit courts and litigants to incur the steep costs entailed in establishing 44 For authority suggesting that quality is unrelated to market structure or that a Neither essay resolves the issue. Although demonstrating that a monopolist tends to underproduce quality, as measured by what a consumer would pay for it, Professor Leland assumes, without discussion, that the demand for quality varies with output. By contrast, Professor Pazner emphasized the importance of assuming that the demand for quality is unrelated to output. Pazner, supra, at 5-6. Moreover, Leland does not claim that a competitor always produces a higher quality product; rather, he concedes that, under certain circumstances, "it is possible that competition could lead to higher output and lower quality" than monopoly. Leland, supra, at 136. Unable to draw a simple inference about product quality from the market structure of an industry, a court that accepted Leland's conclusions would, instead, have to make a complex, and perhaps costly, economic investigation. In their discussion paper, Professors Mussa and Rosen argue that a monopolist who simultaneously produces goods at several quality levels may sometimes degrade the quality of the lowest class of products. Their models, however, rest upon the very strong assumption that a monopolist will engage in a particularly complex form of price discrimination, in which the monopolist recognizes a buyer's tradeoff between quality and price accurately and promptly, and in which the monopolist alters production quickly in order to exploit these tradeoffs. Therefore, the conclusions of Mussa and Rosen must be viewed with skepticism. Further, they have not adapted their model to include oligopoly power-a [Vol. 63:1053 that a seller has exercised market power.45 For these reasons, the existence of monopoly power should militate neither in favor of nor against the enforcement of a contract.46
III. INCOMPETENCE
The foregoing analysis, consistent with traditional contract law, assumed that people act competently to maximize their personal utility. A contrary assumption, however, apparently underlies much of the recent legislation governing consumer contracts. It is now commonly assumed that many people, in particular the poor, cannot competently maximize their utility, because these people are ignorant, inexperienced,47 or simply bad at making their prefmore prevalent variety of market power where such price discrimination would be even more difficult to conduct.
For authority demonstrating that product durability, an important aspect of quality, is unrelated to market structure, see This approach, however, is circular: the party is ruled incompetent because the deal is bad, while the deal is ruled bad because the party is incompetent. Although the content of a contract is often relevant to whether a consumer has acted competently,52 a court or legislature that inferred incompetence only from the terms of a contract would in fact be banning a clause for substantive reasons alone. The question of whether, in a given case, the substantive objections to a clause, standing alone, are sufficiently compelling to justify nonenforcement should be faced openly, not concealed in the apparently neutral language of behavioral judgments. Inferences of incompetence, however, are sometimes based on evidence extrinsic to the terms of an agreement. But these inferences rarely are drawn by experts-psychiatrists or psychologists; they reflect judgments about large groups rather than the results of individual examinations or controlled experiments; and they are often based on anecdotal evidence or subjective impressions. For example, a lawyer-scholar, influential in the consumer protection movement, once argued:
[T]he consumer is often so preoccupied with achieving his primary objective of obtaining credit that he does not evaluate any creditor's offer of exchange in terms of whether the benefit sought is to be paid for at a higher price, in terms of dollars and relinquishment of rights, than he perhaps should pay. The lack of sensitivity to contract terms tends to prevent the consumer from considering alternative arrangements that may be available to him in the market....63 Also, a frequently cited note asserted: The costs of an overinclusive classification of incompetence are twofold. First, an overinclusive classification based on poverty stigmatizes the poor, as being unable to do what "ordinary" people can do.63 Second, overinclusive classifications unnecessarily restrict a competent consumer's freedom to contract. For example, the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act lists, as a factor relevant to a finding of unconscionability, the fact that a seller "knew or had reason to know" that he had taken advantage of a consumer's inability reasonably to protect his interests due to the consumer's incompetence.64 In light of the recent trend towards increased consumer protection, courts are likely to interpret the phrase "had reason to know" as imposing upon sellers a substantial duty to investigate the competence of consumers. Because such individualized investigations are apt to be too costly to conduct in mass transactions, a seller operating in such a market might refuse to that experiments like this raise is whether the sample studied accurately reflects the population at large. "External validity," however, does not seem a problem here because mental patients would seem more likely to behave irrationally than would normal persons. Thus, the fact that such patients act competently and predictably to maximize their own utility is strong evidence that normal persons of similar socioeconomic status also so act.
63 Professor Goldstein recently argued against imposing such a stigma on persons in a context where interference with individual freedom seems intuitively justifiable. In a paper evaluating "the competence and freedom of the institutionalized mentally infirm . . . to make a choice for or against involvement in biomedical research," he recommended that the state presume, as a general rule, that the mentally infirm are competent to make such a choice, and that the state should concern itself with ensuring that the mentally infirm make informed and free choices. This recommendation partly rested on the following argument:
Like the small print on standard contract forms, the signed standard "informed consent" form . . . should not constitute an automatic defense. On the other hand, the common law rule which presumes the competence of all adults to decide for themselves should generally prevail so far as the researcher's claim that a subject or potential subject, even if from the population of institutionalized mentally infirm, had the capacity . . . to choose. To presume otherwise would be to deprive the men- deal with, or raise prices to, persons belonging to groups in which a substantial percentage of members are likely to be judged incompetent. These groups would probably be defined in terms of race, wealth, and other sociologically obvious characteristics. As a result, some members of social groups, such as poor blacks and Chicanos, would face unnecessary restrictions upon their freedom to contract.65
In sum, an overinclusive classification of incompetence creates both unfair stigmatization and undue restrictions upon freedom to contract. Moreover, the rigorous evidence that now exists does not strongly support-indeed, it tends to contradict-the assumption that many consumers are incompetent. Therefore, a court or legislature should not allow the possibility of consumer incompetence to militate against enforcing a contract.66
IV. CONCCLUSION
When invoking the doctrine of unconscionability to invalidate a contract, a court or legislature typically requires the existence of a nonsubstantive objection to the enforcement of the agreement. Nonsubstantive objections arise when a buyer is poor or incompetent or when a seller exercises monopoly power or fails to particularize his contracts. This article demonstrates that none of these 65 As another illustration, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code provides that sellers may only take purchase money security interests when making consumer sales. UNIFORM CON-SUMER CREDIT CODE ? 3.301. This restriction apparently assumes that buyers cannot evaluate competently the benefits they would receive in exchange for other types of security interests. To the extent that consumers use their earning power and personal property as security, a statute that restricts the use of the latter increases the significance of the former as a determinant of whether to give credit. The FTC has proposed a regulation to extend this restriction to jurisdictions not adopting the Code and to restrict the ability of lenders to secure loans with consumers' personal property. See note 16 supra. 66 It is sometimes argued that consumer contracts transmit more information than most consumers can absorb, and thus that many consumers, in a meaningful sense, are incompetent to maximize their utility. See Davis, supra note 27, at 847-50. Similarly, it is sometimes argued that consumers are poor at foretelling the future; that is, they make decisions that irrationally favor present, rather than future, consumption. E. objections support a decision to invalidate a contract. To the contrary, the objection relating to poverty actually weighs in favor of enforcing an agreement.
The arguments outlined above, however, assume that a contracting party has the information necessary to make rational choices in the marketplace. While this assumption is sometimes false, there is a shortage of rigorous analysis concerning how inadequate information influences the content of contracts and how the state should respond when information seems inadequate.67 This shortage is unfortunate, because a party's lack of information is the only remaining factor of nonsubstantive unconscionability that tenably supports a decision to invalidate an agreement. Further research, therefore, is required to illuminate the problem of inadequate information and to ascertain whether the present substantive objections to contract enforcement, standing alone, are now sufficient to justify nonenforcement under the unconscionability doctrine. 
